THE FUTURE CHALLENGES OF MODERATE PESANTREN IN INDONESIA:
The Contest between "Sub-Cultures" and "Sub-Politics"

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ABSTRACT

Moderate Indonesia's Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) and madrasahs are firmly linked with mass organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (N.U.), Nahdhatul Wathan (N.W.), Perti, Jam'iyyah al-Khairat, Mathla'ul Anwar (M.A.), and others. Moderate pesantrens have developed teaching methods and an educational system that are open, moderate, pluralistic, and even resistant to radical ideology, violent extremism, and terrorism throughout the centuries. Western sociological-anthropological investigations by Bruinessen, Fealy, Barton, Steenbrink, Horikoshi, Ziemek, and Indonesian scholars such as Dhofier, Wahid, Rahardjo, and Mansur Noor supported this, with certain limitations. Dhofier asserted that the Islamic boarding schools and madrasas were unique until the 1970s as alternative educational institutions. They built a community that valued *kyai*, *santri*, *langgar*, *pondok*, and *kitab kuning*. However, violent extremism and terrorist acts in Indonesia over more than a decade implicated alumnae of different radical pesantren; four were affiliated with Jamaah Islamiyyah (Al-Islam Lamongan, al-Mukmin Ngruki, Al-Muttaqien Jepara, and Darusy Syahadah Klaten), and the two others (al-Manar and Al-Hikmah) affiliated with Jamaah Ansharus Tauhid (JAT), and Jamaah Ansharus Syariah (JAS). This paper examines and measures moderate pesantren's future challenges, particularly how global Islamic political movements have fueled religious radicalism and fundamentalism in contemporary Indonesia.

Keywords: Pesantren, Madrasah, Moderatism, Radicalism, Violent Extremism.

Abstrak: *Pesantren, dan madrasah keagamaan (pesantren) moderat Indonesia terkait erat dengan ormas seperti Nahdlatul Ulama (N.U.), Nahdhatul Wathan (N.W.), Perti, Jam'iyyah al-Khairat, Mathla'ul Anwar (M.A.), dan lain-lain. Pesantren moderat telah mengembangkan metode pengajaran dan sistem pendidikan yang terbuka, moderat, pluralistik, dan bahkan resisten terhadap ideologi radikal, ekstremisme kekerasan, dan terorisme selama berabad-abad. Investigasi sosiologis-antropologis Barat oleh Bruinessen, Fealy, Barton, Steenbrink, Horikoshi, Ziemek, dan cendekiawan Indonesia seperti Dhofier, Wahid, Rahardjo, dan Mansur Noor mendukung hal ini, dengan batasan tertentu. Dhofier menegaskan bahwa pesantren dan madrasah Islam unik hingga tahun 1970-an sebagai lembaga pendidikan alternatif. Mereka membangun komunitas yang menghargai kiai, santri, langgar, pondok, dan kitab kuning. Namun, ekstremisme kekerasan dan aksi teroris di Indonesia selama lebih dari satu dekade melibatkan alumni pesantren radikal yang berbeda; empat berafiliasi dengan Jamaah Islamiyyah (Al-Islam Lamongan, al-Mukmin Ngruki, Al-Muttaqien Jepara, dan Darusy Syahadah Klaten), dan dua lainnya (al-Manar dan Al-Hikmah) berafiliasi dengan Jamaah Ansharus Tauhid (JAT), dan Jamaah Ansharus Syariah (JAS). Tulisan ini mengkaji dan mengukur tantangan pesantren moderat di masa depan, khususnya bagaimana gerakan politik Islam global telah memicu radikalisme dan fundamentalisme agama di Indonesia kontemporer.*

Kata Kunci: Pesantren, Madrasah, Moderatisme, Radikalisme, Ekstremisme Kekerasan.

INTRODUCTION

The Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in Indonesia, as well as madrasahs and universities affiliated with mass organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (N.U.), Muhammadiyah (M.U.), Nahdhatul Wathan (N.W.), Perti, Jam'iyyah al-Khairat, and Mathla'ul Anwar (M.A.), are considered to be the best in the country. Throughout hundreds of years, Pesantrens has evolved teaching styles and an educational system that are open, moderate, pluralistic, and even resistant to radical ideology, violent extremism, and terrorism.

The findings of a sociological-anthropological study by Zamakhsyari Dhofier or other Muslim intellectuals like Dawam Rahardjo and Iik Mansur Noor support this, albeit with some caveats. Dhofier claims that Islamic boarding schools and madrasas, as alternative educational institutions, were unique and distinctive from their inception until the 1970s. This is because they created a community that valued *kyai*, *santri*, *langgar*, *pondok*, and *kitab kuning*.[1]

In this sense, before the reformation, the Pesantrens were more of a cultural movement distant from the country's political Islamism.[2] Even more firmly, Abdurrahman Wahid ordained pesantren as a "sub-culture" that has become one of the pillars of Indonesian culture and identity in all its diversity.[3] After the reformation, however, the role of radical Islamic boarding schools (radical Pesantrens) in Indonesia's contestation of Islam shifted from that of a "sub-culture" to that of a "sub-politics" with covertly political power-seeking agendas.[4]

Since the beginning of the reformation, Islamic boarding schools have experienced various dynamics and quick changes, mainly when they come into contact with the national and international movement of global Islamic political ideology. During this phase, the pesantren produces incomprehensible meanings, functions, and visuals. Why? Because in this day and age, anything done in the name of freedom and democracy is permissible, including establishing Islamic boarding schools with transnational ideologies.[5]

This type of Islamic boarding school must be reevaluated in light of the proliferation of new types of Islamic boarding schools with transnational ideological patterns, such as Ja'far Umar Thalib's Salafi pesantren, worldwide Islamic boarding schools, and Ma'had az-Zaitun. Socio-anthropological investigations of pesantren have revealed various models, but this characteristic gives them a fresh look and feel.[6] This religious organization has been plagued by a terrible reputation ever since the Black September 11, 2001, the 1st and 2nd Bali

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[1] Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai,* Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994, pp. 44. Dawam Rahardjo, *Pergulatan Dunia Pesantren Membangun Dari Bawah*, Jakarta: P3M, 1998, pp. 45-60. Abdurrahman Wahid, *Pesantren Sebagai Subkultural dalam Menggerakkan Tradisi: Esai-esai Pesantren*, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001, pp. 1-20.·

[2] See Martin Van Bruinessen, *NU: Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru,* Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1994. Greg Fealy, Greg Barton, *Tradisionalisme Radikal: Persinggungan Nahdlatul Ulama-Negara,* Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1997. Karel Steenbrink, *Pesantren, Madrasah dan Sekolah: Pendidikan Islam dalam Kurun Modern*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994. Horoko Horikoshi, *Kiai dan Perubahan Sosial*, Jakarta: P3M, 1987; atau Manfred Ziemek, *Pesantren dalam Perubahan Sosial*, Jakarta: P3M, 1986. Iik Mansur Noor, *Islam in Indonesian World: Ulama of Madura,* Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1990.

[3] Abdurrahman Wahid, *Pesantren Sebagai Subkultural, ...*, pp. 1-20.

[4] The scholars are less familiar with the term "radical" boarding schools. This term refers to three main categories: *First,* institutions of Islamic higher education where some of the graduates has been proven to engage in terrorist activities. *Second*, the Islamic boarding schools with direct link to radical or extremist groups like the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), Jamaah Islamiyyah (JI), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), and others. *Third*, in terrorism trials, these Islamic boarding schools are frequently exposed and mentined as radical ideological bases.

[5] Richard Fox, "Strong and weak media? on the Representation of 'Terorisme" in Contemporary Indonesia", *Journal of Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 40 No. 4 2006, pp. 993–1052.

[6] Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi, dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru,* Jakarta: LP3ES-KITLV, 2008, pp. 98-104.

Bombings, and the arrest of Abu Bakar Ba'ayir, who has been convicted of terrorist acts in Indonesia.[7]

In addition, Western media portrays various narratives and images suggesting that Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia contribute to the religious radicalism movement. In light of recent revelations linking several members of Jamaah Islamiyah (J.I.) and the al-Mukmin Ngruki Islamic boarding school in Solo, led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who was detained and in Nusakambangan prison of being proven of his direct involvement in terrorist activities in Aceh, it is critical to include facts proving the relationship between the radicalism movement and education in radical Islamic boarding schools.[8]

To what extent transnational pesantren models have shifted their mission from providing religious education to accepting and condoning violence in the name of religion is discussable. On the other hand, the only thing holding this institution back is the biased opinions of the general public and the media. As a result, this study seeks to address some of these concerns by investigating how and to what degree the worldwide Islamic political movement has influenced the evolution of Islamic boarding schools in current Indonesia.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Rise of Transnational Fundamentalism

According to researchers, the emergence of global fundamentalism and radicalism in Muslim and non-Muslim countries is generally explained by some theoretical frameworks. *First,* the fundamentalism movement or religious radicalism is a political struggle cloaked in theological ideas.[9] The evidence has been the political movements in the Jewish-Israeli State, the Islamic State-Pakistan, and the Iranian-Islamic State. Politics and religion are almost interwoven in this society. Each aspect reinforces the other to the point where the line between the profane and the sublime is nearly indistinguishable.[10]

This dynamic occurred in Iran and Pakistan. In his book *The Assassins*, Bernard Lewis recounts the history of Isma'ilist Iranian radicalism. The ultimate intersection of religious elements and power politics exists in this instance.[11] On the other hand, establishing the Jewish State has also spawned an antithesis movement, the so-called *Harakat al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyah* (HAMAS). HAMAS is regarded as the most extremist organization in Palestine and frequently violates diplomatic efforts in the Palestinian independence process.[12]

Second, the religious fundamentalist movement can also be viewed as an endeavor to reaffirm the global religious identity as a rational or dialectical response to the global

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[7] Merlyna Lim, "Radical Islamism In Indonesia And Its Middle Eastern Connections", *Journal of Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 15 No. 2 2011, pp. 30-35.

[8] International Crisis Group (ICG), "The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)", *Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°107*, Jakarta/Brussels, 6 July 2010, pp. 2-3.

[9] Nikki R. Keddie, "The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do "Fundamentalisms" Appear?", *Journal of Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 40 No. 4 1998, pp. 696-700.

[10] A.M. Hendropriyono, *Terorisme: Fundamentalis Kristen, Yahudi, Islam,* Jakarta: Kompas Gramedia, 2009, pp. 161-162.

[11] Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam,* New Jersey: Onion Press, 2011, pp. 11, 35, 140.

[12] Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, Berkley Publishing Groups: New York, 2003, pp. 21-50.

wave of modernity, secularism, and globalism, which are considered to dismantle barriers of locality and national traditions.[13] This statement was supported when it was confirmed that modernity threatens regional, national, and international religious identities and narratives. The type of this movement can be seen in how it has grown in Turkey, Thailand, Egypt, and Malaysia.

The case of Turkey demonstrates that secularism and modernism promoted by the West under Kemal Atatürk were deemed to have destroyed the foundations of civilization and the Turkish nation. This wave of Islamism in Turkey stands out while waning public support for the regime threatens the country's continued existence. In some ways, numerous academics foresaw the abrupt transformation of the secular regime in Turkey into an Islamist regime. This problem is made worse because secularism and modernism were forced into the heart of Turkish culture and civilization without an adaptive-rational education process.[14]

Third, the process of colonization and imperialism by one nation over another is inextricably linked to the growth of extreme religious sects. The tyranny and colonization that followed were met with resistance and, eventually, utter opposition. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines is the most commonly cited case in Western and Islamic scholarly writings.

In the Philippines, particularly for the MILF or MNLF movements, the doctrine of the ancestral domain (the land of the forefathers of the Sulu kingdom) is definite and non-negotiable, as is the proof of this claim. This region spans from Luzon to Mindanao. Since 1960, a hundred thousand individuals have perished due to the conflict between the MILF and the Philippine government. The ongoing conflict has resulted in the deaths of at least 120,000 people and the displacement of 700,000 others. This circumstance teaches us that land disputes and identity assertions frequently result in war, a humanitarian catastrophe.[15]

Carmen Abubakar, a Filipino scholar, noted that the Moro National Liberation Front movement, which is frequently identified with the Abu Sayyaf, was led by those who had not attended Islamic boarding schools (madrasahs) as in Indonesian Pesantrens. They are educated in secular institutes of learning. With no exception of Hasyim Salamat, so did the MILF leaders.[16] It was impossible to prevent the fight of the Moro Muslims by employing the same strategy as the colonized nation.

In the 1990s, this circumstance presented liberal Muslim scholars with the dilemma of reading and dividing attitudes. On the one hand, they rejected the Islamic fundamentalism movement's advocacy of absolutism and extremism. Nonetheless, the conflict and Israel's double-standard policies toward the Islamic world, particularly in the

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[13] Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi, dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru,* Jakarta: LP3ES-KITLV, 2008, pp. 228-245.

[14] Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp. 40-58.

[15] Astrid S. Tuminez, *This Land is Our Land: Moro Ancestral Domain and Its Implications for Peace and Development in the Southern Philippines,* ISAIS Review, Edition 27th, No 2, 2007, pp. 80-90.

[16] Carmen Abu Bakr, "Madrasah Education in the Philiphines: Issues, Problems and Government Policies", *Contemporary Islamic Movements in the South and South East Asia: Roots of Fundamentalism, Networks, Policy and Trend,* Jakarta, August 20-23, 2004, pp. 8-12.

Middle East, have placed liberal Muslim intellectuals in a difficult position, particularly concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict and the First Gulf War (Gulf War).[17]

In addition to the aforementioned three frameworks, religious radicalism and fundamentalism in the Islamic world are gaining momentum as a direct result of this predicament. Therefore, we must not only carry out a theoretical criticism of Islamic fundamentalism but also revisit the historical-sociological dimension of the phenomenon of the emergence of fundamentalism, especially as it is unfolding in the present Middle East.

Islamic fundamentalism has been now frequently presented as an alternative to totalitarianism. The argument that Islamic civilization is a new enemy of the West, as predicted by Samuel Huntington in The Class of Civilization, did not sit well with Carmen Abu Bakar, a generally objective academic. Given that nearly two-thirds of Muslims are still working hand in hand to create peace and dialogue between the Islamic world and the West. However, in some ways, they have to face two challenges at once—domestic despotism in Indonesia on the one hand and Western hegemony on the other—such as Huntington's thesis is very inappropriate for some contemporary Muslim thinkers.[18]

Abdurrahman Wahid echoed criticism in a United Nations lecture in response to the question, "What do you think of Huntington's prognosis, which he calls *The Clash of Civilizations*?" Wahid responded that Huntington had less understanding of the "diverse forest of Islam", particularly Indonesian Islam. He gave the example that there is still a great deal of cooperation between the Western and Islamic worlds, which has existed for hundreds of years and has almost permeated various fields, including education, socio-culture, economy, and defense, particularly the relationship between the United States and Indonesia. This fact suggests that *The Clash Of Civilizations* is an illusion devoid of empirical support.[19]

Islam as a religious belief and Islamic radicalism as a political ideology must be separated in numerous ways. In its different manifestations, Islamic fundamentalism is neither an expression nor a manifestation of religious enlightenment or renaissance but rather a political ideology that utilizes religious garb as dogmatic justification, with power politics as its ultimate goal.[20]

Consequently, a true fundamentalist is a political actor (political man) who employs political symbols (political outlook). In all other instances, he is a political activist who is utterly ignorant of religious ethics and self-respect. If this is the case, political Islam can be destructive, not because it will be able to defeat the West (liberal democracy/modernity culture), but because it has the potential to create massive global imbalances.[21]

In this instance, moderate or liberal groups must acknowledge and denounce the fundamentalists' intolerant nature, interpretation of the text, and tendency to depart from religious doctrines. This includes overt acts of violence and covert attacks on Arab intellectuals, who are generally seen as moderates for attempting to challenge the

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[17] Daniel Brumberg, *Democratization Versus Liberalization In The Arab World: Dilemmas And Challenges For U.S Foreign Policy,* New York: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, pp. 8-12.

[18] Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism, …,* pp. 193-197.

[19] Abdurrahman Wahid, *Dialogue among Civilizations: The round table on the eve of the United Nations Millennium Summit,* New York: UNESCO Publishing, 2001, pp. 40-42, 94-95.

[20] Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism, …,* pp. 197-201.

[21] Nikki R. Keddie, *"The New Religious Politics, …,* pp. 696-700.

extremists' dogma gently. Such cases include the slaying of Arab writer Faraq Fuda, the slander of Egyptian intellectual Nasr Hamid Abu-Zaid, and the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz. By distorting the meaning of specific chapters in the Koran, extremists have orchestrated this tragedy as a terror tactic. This is because killing an apostate is never explicitly sanctioned in the Qur'an. There will be extreme abuse of the edict because it is based on an unIslamic interpretation.[22]

In addition, fundamentalist groups' use of anti-Western rhetoric as propaganda is only an attempt to deceive the public. Fundamentalists continue to instill anti-western sentiments into the awareness of Muslims worldwide. They employ all means necessary, including interpreting the traditional Islamic heritage by their own goals while adorning modernism with symbols of their orthodoxy. This power philosophy is considerably more perilous than violent fanatics. Because of their power politics, they have no qualms about eradicating and replacing all ideologies and notions of nation-states that are still evolving in the globe today with an Islamic State.[23]

Besides, the fundamentalists will never be able to implement their political agenda, although they could one day cause widespread global unrest. In addition to theological disagreements among Muslim scholars, Islamic fundamentalism is a political agenda for establishing a new regime, not an expression of religious renewal. This vision is nothing more than the regime's will (totalitarianism rule).[24]

In many instances, this vision will provide a formidable obstacle to implementing democracy in our times. Instead of unraveling the fundamentalist rise from an economic perspective, Tibi is more likely to capture the problem of identity as one of the essential factors in the revival of fundamentalism, which is the result of the traumatic response of some parts of the Islamic world to modernism and globalization.

There have been numerous developments in the fundamentalists' movement patterns and techniques in their propaganda campaigns to establish an Islamic State, including the global fundamentalism movement, reaching Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia.

The Cycle of Violent Extremism in Indonesia

From the Bali Bombing I on October 12, 2002, to the bombing of the Adz-Dzikro Mosque in Cirebon on April 15, 2011, it appeared that many alumnae of radical Islamic boarding schools affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah (J.I.), such as the Al-Mukmin in Solo, Al-Mutaqin, and Darusy Syahadah in Central Java, were involved. The other schools, such as Al-Manar (Abdullah Sunata's pesantren) and Al-Hikmah (where Aman Abdurrahman, a leader of Jamaah Tauhid wal Jihad (JTWJ),[25] was one among the teachers), were not affiliated with Jamaah Islamiyah (J.I.). How far do these radical Islamic boarding schools go in condoning violent ideology?

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[22] Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism, …*, pp. 207-209.

[23] James Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing,* USA: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 226. See also Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism,* p. 199.

[24] Paul Brykczynski, "Radical Islam and the Nation: The Relationship between Religion and Nationalism in the Political Thought of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb", *History of Intellectual Culture,* 2005, Vol 5, No. 1, p. 207. See also Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism,* p. 215.

[25] Solahuddin, *NII Sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia,* Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2011, pp. 53-69.

The research of the Setara Institute on Militant Islam in Indonesia demonstrates that specific extremist organizations utilizing pesantren graduates cannot be divorced from the roots of Islamist organizations that have battled for an Islamic State in Indonesia since the independence period; the ideological connection between present religious teachings and the early days of independence.[26] Even while some pesantren alumnae are active in religious radicalism, this cannot be used to conclude that pesantren is an institution that tolerates acts of violence, especially given that pesantren is a breeding ground for militant groups that are accustomed to committing violent crimes.[27]

The fact that not all pesantren alumnae become religious leaders. The disparity of alumnae cannot be an indicator or metric that a school will only create one sort of profession while denying other graduates whose contributions to the community are no less significant. The Ngruki Islamic Boarding School, which has been in the spotlight due to the Ba'asyir factor, is the same as other pesantren that have produced a variety of alumnae, including clergy, bureaucrats, academics, NGO activists, politicians, and even correspondents for the Washington Post covering Southeast Asia.[28]

Indeed, in some radical pesantren, the increasing exposure of alumnae to radicalism and violent extremism can be attributed to the subjects and teaching curricula offered. The sentiment of fellow Muslims regarding the various injustices committed against Muslims in various conflict zones, particularly the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, is another factor that enables some pesantren graduates to engage in religious extremism.[29] In addition, the interaction of Pesantren alumnae with radical or extremist organizations is a pull factor for their involvement in the radicalization and terrorism circle.[30]

Powerlessness, both socially and culturally, and perhaps most importantly, economically, is a further significant factor. Some pesantren graduates are interested in the literal interpretation of jihad as physical resistance due to the powerlessness of macro-level Muslims. Death by jihad is viewed as a means of escaping the crushing weight of helplessness.[31] However, when compared to the vast majority of moderate Pesantren alumnae, the alumnae trapped in radicalism or terrorism are insignificant in number.

The potential for extremist Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia, including one in Cirebon, is immense, according to several works of literature. Several studies have focused on the two Islamic boarding schools in this area, the Al-Muttaqien Islamic Boarding School, Beber Cirebon, which can be found in Patapan Village in the district of Beber. The Islamic boarding school sits in a rural area away from other buildings, in a stretch of rice fields next to the main Cirebon-Kuningan road. One of the three suicide bombers in the 2005 Bali

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[26] Sri Yunanto et. al (ed), *Gerakan Militan Islam di Indonesia dan Asia Tenggara,* Jakarta: The Ridep Institute 2003, pp. 24-25.

[27] Ismail Hasani, Bonar Tigor Naipospos, *Dari Radikalisme Menuju Terorisme: Studi Relasi dan Transformasi Organisasi Islam Radikal di Jawa Tengah dan D.I Yogyakarta,* Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, 2012, pp. 95-108.

[28] Noor Huda Ismail, *Temanku, Teroris? Saat Santri Ngruki Menempuh Jalan Berbeda*, Jakarta: Hikmah Press, 2010, pp. 209-239.

[29] Solahuddin, *NII Sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia,* Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2011, pp. 70-75.

[30] Ismail Hasani, Bonar Tigor Naipospos, *Dari Radikalisme Menuju Terorisme, ...,* pp. 95-108..

[31] Iqbal Ahmed, "Roots of Religious Right", in Dohra Ahmed (ed.), *Between Past and Future: Selected Essays on South Asia,* New York: Oxford University Press 2004, ..., pp. 7-10.

Bombing II tragedy, Salik Firdaus, taught at this pesantren. And so did Sholahuddin al-Ayubi, a teacher who was arrested in an April 2006 police raid on a hideout in Wonosobo.[32]

The International Crisis Group (ICG) cited, for instance, the Al-Muttaqien Islamic Boarding School as a potential for a hard-line and extremist sect. In their study titled Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base, published August 27, 2009, the ICG described the terrorist network of the Nordin M. Top group. In addition to Al Muttaqien Beber (Cirencester), ICG listed some other Islamic residential schools as members of the J.I. network, including Al Muttaqien (Jepara), Darusy Shahadah (Boyolali), Darul Manar (Kediri), Ma'had Aly An-Nuur (Solo), and Darul Fitrah are Islamic boarding schools (Sukoharjo). The Al-Mutaqien Islamic Boarding School only educates junior high school students (currently 50) who were transferred to the Husnul Hadi Islamic Boarding School in Panawuan Village, Cilimus Kunaan, for high school.[33]

The Nurul Hadid Islamic Boarding School, located in Winduhaji Village, Sedong District, Cirebon Regency, is another connected boarding school with the Al-Muttaqien Beber Islamic Boarding School. In a document, it is said that the Nurul Hadid Community Education and Development Foundation, located at Jalan Mayor Sangun Jatibarang Indramayu, operates this Islamic boarding school as a corporate charity. Any visitor to the Nurul Hadid Jatibarang Foundation will be able to see the ties that connect it to the Al-Muttaqien Beber Islamic boarding school; one of the advisors is H. Salim Bajri, who played a part in the establishment of Al-Muttaqin. Al-Muttaqin was founded by Nurul Hadid Jatibarang Foundation chairman Ustadz Abdul Muid, and Muhammad Salik Firdaus (the Bali II suicide bomber) is listed as the Public Relations section of the Nurul Hadid Foundation, as well as a member of the teaching staff and treasurer (in the school year 2003–3004) at Nurul Hadid Islamic Boarding School Winduhaji Sedong Cirebon.[34]

In 2003, this Nurul Hadid Islamic boarding school cared for sixteen foster children, orphans, and hundreds of other students. Madrasah Aliyah (M.A.) Nurul Hadid is a formal education component of this pesantren. Madrasah Aliyah Nurul Hadid serves approximately sixty (male) students from the Nurul Hadid Islamic Boarding School. At first appearance, the works of Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna, Ibn Taimiyyah, Ibn Qoyyim al-Jauziyah, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Abdullah bin Baz, Abu Rabi' al Madhkahli, Abdullah Azzam, and other Salafi Wahhabi academics are references to this type of Salafi pesantren.[35]

Western Criticism of Modernism

The many ways in which both Islamic and western scholars comprehend fundamentalist, particularly in the Middle East and third world nations, must adhere to two theoretical perspectives. First, Islamic and Western scholarly studies depict the origin and growth of fundamentalism based purely on socioeconomic background. We can utilize comparative political theory and the politics of naming or labeling to reconstruct

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[32] International Crisis Group (ICG), *Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base,* Asia Briefing N°95 27 Aug 2009, p. 10.

[33] International Crisis Group (ICG), *Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base, ...,* p. 10.

[34] International Crisis Group (ICG), *Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base, ...,* p. 11.

[35] International Crisis Group (ICG), *Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base, ...,* p. 11.

perspective in light of the tendency of the majority of Islamic and Western scholars to view this pesantren as illogical concerning Western-style modernism.[36]

This approach can be utilized to examine fundamentalist pesantren via the lens of the locus of belief system. In this instance, the belief system can be seen as a critical perspective if it is a foundationalist on Western rationality discourse and an antithesis to Western political behavior, particularly post-enlightenment. [37] This is crucial for incorporating the concept of Islamic fundamentalism into the trans-cultural theory's overall framework. By drawing parallels between the fears of fundamentalist Christians, post-modernists, conservatives, and communitarians about the character/nature of political thought and the constraints of modern western rationality, the "unexcavated" features of fundamentalist pesantren will be revealed.

If this is the case, it is possible that the western rationalist discursive picture thus far is a reflection of the discourse of knowledge-power relation, how the mode of discourse is deemed more scientific-rational by the authorities, which then transforms into tools, procedures, and criteria for understanding that command, produce images, and validate a claim. Certain truths while dismissing other techniques as unreasonable and unscientific.

Similarly, Edward Said stated that in one episode, orientalism represents cultural hegemony in which pictures of the eastern world are formed primarily by the western world, focused on the exteriority and not the characters' interiority. In addition, when this component of exteriority is associated with the dominance of western power, the reality is the truth about the truth of the eastern world being controlled and generated by the positivistic logical Western paradigm.[38]

Through Foucault and Said, it appears that the Islamic political movement thus far can be seen as a response of Muslim intellectuals or thinkers to the nearly two-hundred-year-long experience of western power and dominance. This response can take several forms, from acceptance to absolute rejection of modernism and western culture. Nonetheless, the central concept of Islamic political thinking, as a response to resistance to western political thought, poses issues for western researchers who study the works of Muslim philosophers and ideologues.[39]

In particular, this line of thinking emerged as a "resistance reaction" that differentiated between the "rational" and "modern" patterns of western ideology and the "irrational" and "traditional" patterns of Islamic ideology. As a result, it is simple to pinpoint Islamic philosophers who reacted ideologically by adopting modernism and rationality. Bernard Lewis created one such model when he argued that misperceptions about Islamic lag stem from misunderstandings of the true (or imagined) scope of Islam's historical glory. Even though many western academics and experts disagree with the differentiation of this model since it is, of course, diametrical and positivistic.

We must also keep in mind the indisputable assertions of western academics who place Islamic thought in an irrational typology, giving western thinkers the impression that they have carte blanche to translate and explain Islamic thought according to their arbitrary criteria, especially in light of the rise of the Islamic fundamentalism movement. In the end,

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[36] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism*, United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. xi-xii.

[37] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, ...*, pp. 3-6.

[38] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror*, ..., pp. 22-23.

[39] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror*, ..., pp. 33-35.

western academics' reading bias led them to conclude a priori that fundamentalism emerged as a response mechanism due to the persistence of "structural problems," such as economic, social, and political inequality aspects that have been experienced by middle eastern society. Euben argues that this is not the case because the movement's core tenets have always been presented as a viable ethical and political alternative to the dominant tenets of modernism and globalism.

Islamic political thought must be placed and understood based on its context and scientific status, or, put another way; it must be understood within the framework of its adherents' thinking if we are to understand the patterns and models of transcendence of thought that go beyond the paradigm of the rationalists. Because we will not be getting the facts but rather a false image produced from the reflection of apriori, we will be stuck in a skewed reading of this movement's meaning and worth.[40] If this is the case, the social analysis developed by western-rationalists is insufficient because it only leads every scholar of Islamic fundamentalism to the movement's intellectual treasures as an "epiphenomenon" without generating any insight into the movement's vision of the universality of its political ethics. Exposing the fundamentalist group's true vision and objective and explaining why it matters is crucial in this situation. Euben's reading paradigm is useful for anyone worried about Islamic extremism, and it may be utilized for academic research and to foster a dialogue between the contending sides.[41]

The fundamentalist ethical system, for instance, was remarked by Bassam Tibi that the western world should view Islam as an ethical system, as do certain fundamentalists; Sharia is a teaching drawn from the Al-Quran and Sunnah for some Muslims. For some fundamentalists, the concept of a nation-state (nation-state) derives from western civilization, which may be viewed as foreign and occidental. This misunderstanding frequently leads to conceptual difficulties, stigmatization, discrimination, and mutual hostility between Westerners and Muslims. According to Tibi, this tension must be resolved by intensive and open discussion efforts between the two parties so that various prejudices can be eliminated further.[42]

Fundamentalist Criticism of Westernism

Based on the writings of both Qutb and Hassan al-Banna, as well as the author's and text's conceptual frameworks, rather than imposing our own, we can better grasp and study the issue of nationalism in both Islamic ideological leaders' political ideas. The research is incorporated into a pre-conceptual positivist theoretical framework.[43]

To quote Lewis, the question is[44] whether Qutb and al-Banna are old thinkers whose relevance is limited to the golden period of pre-modern Islam or whether they are champions of a postmodern criticism of modernity (purveyors of a postmodern critique of modernity). This can be shown if we are willing to read concepts and concepts without any

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[40] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, …*, pp. 37-40.

[41] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, …*, pp. 42-43.

[42] Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism, …*, pp. 5-8.

[43] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, …*, pp. 43-45.

[44] Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*, (New York: Oxford University Press).

preconceived notions. Particularly, we must highlight the teachings of Qutb and al-Banna regarding their conception of nationalism.[45]

The work *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* appears to contain Qutb's political and nationalistic perspective (road signs). This book covers the notion of jahiliyyah as well as various other principles concerning freedom, equality, science, epistemology, gender, and race, as well as the vision of Islamic political ethics, which became one of the pillars of the struggle for the establishment of the Islamic State (Islamic State). From Morocco to Indonesia, Qutb's beliefs were able to transcend national boundaries in the Islamic world, and due to his controversial views on the Egyptian State, he was hanged by the regime of Gamal bin Abd al-Nasser in 1966.[46]

Reformers, Islamists, and radical-revolutionary Islamic groups from Egypt to Indonesia embraced Qutb's political ethics in Ma'alim fi at-Tariq as the foundation for the Islamic revivalism movement. In the book Ma'alim fi at-Tariq, the author formulates numerous notions of the world order that are fought for, such as jahiliyyah-modern and just society, freedom and equality, gender and race, science and epistemology, political action, morality and politics, and the Islamic State.[47]

In addition, *Ma'alim fi at-Tariq* examines the fundamentals of establishing an Islamic State (Daulah Islamiyyah) as the objective of conflict. He elaborated on the opening statement of this book, "Humanity is on the verge of extinction now..."[48] Sayyid Qutb interprets the multifaceted issue currently confronting humanity as a conscious divergence from God's authority and humanity's inherent dignity. One of Qutb's proposed solutions to this crisis is to "desecularize the political system" and replace it with Allah's sovereignty *(hakimiyya)*, i.e., by establishing an Islamic state under the leadership of a Caliph who directs state affairs following the spirit of al-Quran, Sunnah, and Tradition of early Salafus-Shalih generations.

The most important goals of this Hakimiyyah system are total human submission to the will and authority of Allah SWT, social justice, wealth limits, wealth redistribution, and minimum wages. In a way, the solution to the dilemma is to emphasize the ideals of piety and simplicity of life. This concept is extremely tough, but its practical implementation is sometimes nearly impossible. Nonetheless, Qutb has articulated the course of the conflict and become an ideologue of Islamic State combatants in any region, including Indonesia.[49]

Thus, Qutb's political thoughts and visions cannot be understood through "language of irrationalism" or "anti-modernism" because this is the result of Qutb's ijtihad to incorporate the metaphysical dimension in the political context, which western academics have ignored for a long time, namely how to embrace the non-rational dimension of thought (embrace of the non-rational).

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[45] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, ...*, pp. 45-48.

[46] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, ...*, pp. 51-53.

[47] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, ...*, p. 55.

[48] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, ...*, pp. 57.

[49] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, ...*, p. 58.

However, how does Qutb's critique of western modernism stack up against that of other thinkers like Robert N. Bellah, Hannah Arendt, Alasdair MacIntyre,[50] Daniel Bell,[51] and Richard John Neuhaus?[52] To give just a few examples, Bellah labels modernism as a "permissive therapeutic culture," "the culture of separation," and "the culture of extreme individuality" (the culture of radical individualism). His book, Habits of the Heart,[53] explicitly states this "What Is Authority"? "Human Conditions," and "The Crisis in Education" are three essays by Arendt that attempt to place the issues of modernism. In these three books, Arendt critiques the authority that the West generates and how it perceives the rest of the world from an external vantage point.[54]

In that case, Qutb's ideas would share much with those of the aforementioned western philosophers. This agreement can be found in their shared concerns about the decline of community, the destructive effects of excessive individualism, and the dearth of purpose in contemporary life (the loss of meaning in modern society). Both groups have a common set of worries but approach the problem differently. What needs to be highlighted from this comparative political theory approach and naming politics is that Islamic fundamentalism is not based solely on socioeconomic and cultural contexts but on a critical spirit of rationalism, modernism, and globalism that continues to strive to define and produce others from their perspective.

CONCLUSION

More than a decade of violent extremism and terrorism in Indonesia involved alumnae of various radical pesantren; four were affiliated with Jamaah Islamiyyah (Al-Islam Lamongan, al-Mukmin Ngruki, Al-Muttaqien Jepara, and Darusy Syahadah Klaten), and the other two (al-Manar and Al-Hikmah) affiliated with Jamaah Ansharus Tauhid (JAT) and Jamaah Ansharus Syariah (JAS). The books of Ibnu Taimiyyah, Ibn Qoyyim al-Jauziyah, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah bin Baz, Abu Rabi' al Madhkahli, Abdullah Azzam, and other Wahhabis scholars are the main sources and references to this type of radical pesantrens.

However, looking back in time, one thing that stands out about moderate pesantren is their commitment to maintaining cultural traditions. The moderate pesantren and madrasahs have strong ties to mass groups like as Nahdlatul Ulama, Nahdhatul Wathan, Perti, Jam'iyyah al-Khairat, Mathla'ul Anwar, and others. Pesantrens have established open, moderate, and pluralistic teaching methods and an educational system that is

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[50] One of MacIntyre's criticisms of modernism is that modernity is merely a culture of emotivism. Garcia, J., "Modern(ist) Moral Philosophy and MacIntyrean Critique," In M. Murphy (Ed.), *Alasdair MacIntyre: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 95-111. See also Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror,* pp. 123-137.

[51] Bell criticised modernism at two levels; meaning and communities. Daniel Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," *The Journal of Aesthetic Education*, Vol. 6, No. 1/2, Jan-Apr., 1972, pp. 11-38. See also Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror,* pp. 144-150.

[52] One of Neuhaus's criticisms is that the prohibition of religious morality in the public space will have an impact not only on moral chaos, but also result in a loss of meaning, the so-called meaningless society. Neuhaus, R. J., *The Naked Public Square: Religion and democracy in America,* Grand Rapids: W. B.Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1984, pp. 257-259. See also Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror,* pp. 138-141.

[53] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, ...,* pp. 142-143.

[54] Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror, ...,* pp. 127-132.

resistant to extremist ideology, violent extremism, and terrorism over the years. Walisongo and their successors and disciples, so-called *Kyai* and *Ulema,* became a role model, an inspiration for moderate pesantren education and teaching, and their efforts to preserve indigenous and peace culture in the face of Islam in the archipelago have a long and storied history. Strong evidence of acculturation in peaceful cohabitation includes Walisongo's use of persuasion in sprces reading Islam and his tolerance for native Hindu-Buddhist culture in portions of Java. By subordinating local cultural values to Islamic norms, scholars and moderate pesantren leaders have preserved and respected them, simultaneously demonstrating the presence of an Islamic cultural model.[55]

Hans Kung, a modern German cleric who promotes dialogue by taking local values into account, has produced a global ethics similar to the notion of maintaining local culture developed by the world of moderate pesantren. Words like "not only freedom but also justice," and "not only equality but also pluralism," and "not only brotherhood of men but also women," and "not only side by side but also peace" are part of the campaign rhetoric.[56]

It is clear from this that the ideals espoused in the aforementioned remark are paramount in the moderate pesantren community. For example, the pesantren community's embrace of local culture signifies that they are working to promote peace in their region. Further, the intellectual legacy of the moderate pesantren reflects the value of cultural preservation. Islamic boarding school curricula are based on *kitab kunings* that have been preserved and passed down from generation to generation. Books from the past represent the right tradition and keep alive the religious wisdom that great scholars of Islam have passed down through the ages.[57]

The educational purpose of the moderate pesantren's contents is to give pupils access not only to the legacy of the past but also to the direction of future duties, particularly for the cosmological equilibrium of life, which emphasizes peace and harmony with God, society, and nature. Within the curriculum of moderate Pesantrens, religious instruction is always inclusive and never exclusive. In the huge Salafiyah-Syafi'iyyah pesantren, such as Tebu Ireng Jombang, Lirboyo, and Ploso in Kediri, Asembagus, and other moderate pesantren, Fiqh and Usul-Fiqh, together with other Islamic scientific instruments, are the most prominent themes.

Even though they were taught the stringent fiqh reasoning of the Shafi'i school of thought, they have been exposed to various viewpoints from the start. This is a deliberate endeavor to foster tolerance for divergent viewpoints. This variety in fiqh is also reinforced by the tolerant Sufi pesantren tradition, which is based on indigenous knowledge. Even though Kyai Asnawi Kudus studied extensively in Mecca throughout his lifetime, he remained steadfast in upholding the customs of the Kudus people, who did not slaughter cows and kept the Menara Kudus mosque edifice, which resembles a Hindu temple.

On the other hand, cultural heritage and tolerance values such as these must be maintained concurrently so that this circumstance would eventually motivate the moderate Islamic boarding school community to continue creating a humanist Islam that is

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[55] Agus Sunyoto, *Wali Songo: Rekonstruksi Sejarah Yang Disingkirkan,* Jakarta: Transpustaka, 2011, pp. 27-62.

[56] Hans Küng, *A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 145-178.

[57] Abdurrahman Wahid, "Principles of Pesantren Education, in Manfred Oepen and Wolfgang Karcher, *The Impact of Pesantren in Education and Community Development in Indonesia*, Jakarta: P3M, 1988, pp. 197.

free of extremism and terrorism. As an internal filter for Islamic boarding schools that tend to legitimize acts of violence and terrorism in the name of Islam, the status of moderate pesantren as an educational institution with cultural character must thus continue to be supported, facilitated, upgraded, and developed for future Indonesian challenges.

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